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Summary: Social norms help to solve collective dilemmas. In addition to the internalization of norms, social control, ra-
tional calculation, and rational acceptance, this paper analyzes the role of information in regard to compliance with
norms. We predict that people will cooperate if they believe that others will cooperate as well, and that they will defect
if they believe that others will defect. Each reaction respresents a rational course of action. Beliefs about the validity of
norms are influenced by information, whether public (as obtained from the media) or private (gained from personal ex-
perience), with which individuals update their beliefs. Complementing existing explanations of norm compliance, this
paper studies the effect on norm compliance of information which allows individuals to adjust beliefs about whether a
norm is valid. The empirical findings based on a multilevel analysis of survey data from 24 countries strongly confirm
the prediction that collectively held beliefs about the validity of norms are a major factor in determining compliance,
comparable in its strength to the internalization of norms.
Keywords: Beliefs; Social Norms; Deviant Behavior; Information; Reciprocity.
Zusammenfassung: Soziale Normen helfen bei der Lçsung von kollektiven Dilemmata. Zusätzlich zu den Erklärungs-
faktoren Internalisierung, soziale Kontrolle, rationales Kalkül und rationale Akzeptanz analysiert dieser Aufsatz den Ef-
fekt von Informationen auf die Befolgung von Normen. Individuen, so wird argumentiert, befolgen soziale Normen, so-
lange sie überzeugt sind, dass die Norm gültig ist, d. h. sich auch alle anderen daran halten. Wenn die Norm hingegen
nicht mehr als gültig angesehen wird und das Individuum nicht mehr von die Gültigkeit der Norm überzeugt ist, wird es
die Norm missachten. Beide Reaktionen lassen sich als Ergebnis einer rationalen Wahl auffassen. Überzeugungen hin-
sichtlich der Gültigkeit von Normen werden durch Informationen beeinflusst, und zwar sowohl durch çffentliche Infor-
mationen (etwa aus den Medien) als auch durch private Erfahrungen. Individuen korrigieren und aktualisieren ihre
Überzeugungen hinsichtlich der Gültigkeit von Normen auf der Grundlage dieser Informationen. In Ergänzung der vor-
liegenden Ansätze zur Erklärung von Normbefolgung testet dieser Aufsatz die Relevanz von Informationen. Die empiri-
schen Ergebnisse zeigen basierend auf einer Mehrebenenanalyse von Umfragedaten aus 24 Ländern eine starke Evidenz
dafür, dass die gesellschaftliche Verbreitung von Überzeugungen hinsichtlich der Gültigkeit von Normen ein wichtiger
Faktor für ihre Befolgung sind, der in seiner Stärke mit dem Effekt der Internalisierung von Normen vergleichbar ist.
Schlagworte: Überzeugungen (beliefs); Soziale Normen; Abweichendes Verhalten; Information; Reziprozität.
1 Introduction: Compliance and Deviance
Social order and, to some degree, economic welfare
depend on the compliance of people with norms
(Putnam 1993; Fukuyama 1995; Tyler 1990). How
social order among selfish rationalists originally
comes about is still a controversial issue (Voss
1985; Axelrod 1984, 1986; Elster 1989a; Opp
1983, 2000; Bravo & Tamburino 2008), but once
it is there, it has a range of positive effects in many
domains of society.
Complying with certain standards of behavior –
henceforth labeled “norms” – is in most interac-
tions beneficial from a societal perspective. But
from the perspective of the individual, there is of-
tentimes also a substantial incentive to defect, res-
pectively a substantial risk that the other side in an
interaction will defect, thus exploiting those indivi-
duals ready to cooperate. Social order and coopera-
tion is beneficial for everybody, particularly in the
long run, but it might be even better to be the only
defector in a cooperative world.
Norms, whether formal or informal ones, are func-
tional for solving problems of interpersonal coope-
ration. Norm compliance has accordingly been one
of the most persistent issues in sociological theory
and research. While formal norms are sanctioned
by the authority of the state, the fear of possible
(but by no means certain) punishment does not
generally cause law-abidance (Tyler 1990; Scholz
& Lubell 1998). Furthermore, there are vast “gray
areas” of unregulated interpersonal exchange. Re-
putation and third party sanctioning can foster
norm compliance, but there are also interpersonal
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exchanges of a one-shot or anonymous nature in
which deviant behavior cannot be sanctioned (Burt
& Knez 1995). Here only the individual’s decision
to comply with a given norm determines the actual
course of action. Sociologists have argued that in
particular with regard to situations of the latter type,
compliance with norms is not a result of rational cal-
culation, but occurs because the norm is internalized
(Scott 1971). Supplementary to the “internalization
by socialization” thesis, the psychology of coopera-
tion found an inborn tendency to cooperate (Fehr &
Gintis 2007) that favors reciprocity, if not altruism
(Diekmann & Voss 2008). Theorists of social order,
beginning with Hobbes and Locke, have also been
delivering a rational underpinning for this tendency
to cooperate: it is not irrational to sacrifice some uti-
lity by abiding to norms and the “social contract”
because of the many advantages arising from the
general validity of norms such as predictability of be-
havior and social order (Voss 1985; Axelrod 1986;
Opp 2000; Elster 1989a).
In this paper, an argument will be explored and tes-
ted that results from combining analytically the
inborn tendency to cooperate with the rationality-
based underpinning of the genesis of norms. Com-
pliance with norms is based on reciprocity, or, more
concretely, on the belief that reciprocity will occur.
An individual may reason as follows: “I comply, be-
cause the others also comply”, and, “I comply with
the norms, as long as everybody else does”. But
does everybody indeed comply? To this question,
the individual would respond: “I comply, as long as
I hold the belief that the norms are valid in the so-
ciety I live in. If the norms are no longer valid, I’d
be a fool to be the only one complying with norms
any longer.” In this scenario, compliance with
norms is primarily determined by whether the indi-
vidual believes that the norms are valid and thus
that complying with them makes sense.
This paper will investigate the importance of infor-
mation – in the form of public information and pri-
vate experience – which allows individuals to up-
date their beliefs about whether a norm is valid.
The argument is that, apart from internalization
and an inbuilt tendency for cooperative behavior,
norm compliance has a strong component of condi-
tionality. When playing what is basically an iterated
prisoner’s dilemma or, respectively, an assurance
game, it is, for the sake of the long term pay-off, ra-
tional to comply with the cooperative norm using
Rapoport’s tit-for-tat strategy. However, this is true
only for as long as the norm is valid. Lacking objec-
tive information about the actual likelihood of
compliance with norms in society, individual beliefs
about this likelihood are the relevant factor. If an
individual subjectively believes that a norm is valid,
which is to say that the norm is complied with in
all or at least most interactions, the individual will
comply. If the individual does not believe this to be
the case, it will tend to opportunistically deviate
from the norm.
There is a substantial body of empirical and con-
ceptual work on the effect norms exert on actual
behavior (e.g. Cialdini 2003, 2007), and there is
also research using experimental evidence on the
effect of the situational context on the abidance to
norms (e.g. Keizer et al. 2008). Despite many sub-
stantial similarities across the findings, experimen-
tal studies of cooperation also point to certain cul-
tural differences (cf. Diekmann 2008). This raises
the question whether are there similar effects across
the varied and often diffuse societal instances of
norm compliance and deviance. Irrespective of the
actual causal mechanism, one can ask whether the
presence of litter on the street increases the likeli-
hood that an individual also litters, and whether in-
formation or the prevalence of norm breaking that
is collectively avaible at the societal level also in-
creases individual-level norm-breaking.
Using survey data and multilevel regression, the
present paper will compare the importance of con-
textual features and individual-level properties for
the abidance to norms. The explanatory contribu-
tion of the proposed explanation will be compared
to the contribution of other explanations of compli-
ance and deviant behavior available in sociology
(internalization and temptation) and in political
science (social capital and “having had a say in set-
ting the norm”).
2 Reasons of Norm Compliance:
Internalization, Social Control, Rationality,
and Information
Compliance with norms comes in many forms, not
all of which are subject to law and thus legally en-
forceable. Norm compliance takes the “negative”
form of not defecting in a cooperative exchange, of
not exploiting a common pool, or of not breaking a
norm. Positively put, compliance with norms may
take the form of contributing to a public good even
though the cost-benefit calculus dictates that this is
irrational. To explain why people comply with
norms – most of the time voluntarily and even in
settings in which they could deviate without being
noticed – several disciplines have proposed a varie-
ty of answers.
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The sociological “standard” theory about the com-
pliance of individuals with norms refers to a pro-
cess of internalization (Durkheim 1938; Parsons
1937; Scott 1971). Norms are internalized during
socialization, work by the “grip on the mind”, and
thus are not subject to rational calculation (e.g. Els-
ter 1989b). Persons do not calculate the pros and
cons of abiding to a norm in each and any situa-
tion, but they comply with norms because this is
“appropriate”. Underlying this automatism is a
process, postulated by the sociological theory of
roles, in which persons play the role which is
appropriate in the situation which they encounter
(March & Olsen 1989).
Investigations of the psychological mechanism un-
derlying the framing of situations have shown that
the automatism assumed by sociological theory is
spurious (Esser 2000, 2001). Esser’s frame-selec-
tion-model presumes that there are “frames”, un-
derstood as models of typical situations, coupling
symbols by which the situation can be recognized
and a certain behavioral repertoire for this particu-
lar situation. These “frames” are shared in a culture
and transmitted by socialization. A frame is chosen
rationally as a situation is recognized by its sym-
bols, and the associated behavior repertoire is acti-
vated. But the consequences of a certain framing al-
so affect the choice of a frame: if the situation is
associated with negative consequences, the indivi-
dual will prefer to interpret the situation in terms of
a different frame, even if certain symbols are there-
fore ignored. Assume, for instance, that for a parti-
cular situation following a norm is part of the beha-
vior collectively associated with this situation.
Deviant behavior comes about if the situation is
not recognized, e.g. because conflicting symbols are
present, or if the temptation to deviate is too
strong. In the latter case, the individual chooses to
see the situation as one in which ignoring the norm
is acceptable.
Political science has also considered the problem of
norm abidance. Just two approaches shall be men-
tioned here; firstly, the social capital approach. This
approach is close to the sociological theory of inter-
nalization, but it puts additional emphasis on social
control. According to this approach, if one is social-
ly integrated, e.g. in a group, one will be more co-
operative and, in particular, more trusting, but one
will also be aware that the group will sanction non-
cooperative behavior like free-riding or defection
(Putnam 1993; Burt & Knez 1995; Boix & Posner
1998: 687, 690; Simpson 2006; Horne 2008). A
particular hypothesis common to this approach is
that social capital in the form of generalized trust
and social engagement (memberships in groups)
increases compliance with norms.
Secondly, there is an approach which could be la-
beled “instrumental” or “rational” acceptance (cf.
Kelman 2006: 14). The norms (notably the laws) of
society may not be considered as intrinsically
valuable but found to be better than any other alter-
native. In this perspective, norms derive their
importance in an indirect manner: citizens acknow-
ledge that norms and compliance are important
because the functioning and performance of the
collective depend on it. And, moreover, in democra-
cies, the norms are created with input from citizens
who live according to norms which they themselves
determine (Letki 2006).
Game theory, in particular the work on iterated ga-
mes, delivers an argument why abiding to norms is
to be expected even among selfish actors. Compli-
ance with norms is the behavior which is rational in
the long term, granting the highest payoffs in repea-
ted interactions (Axelrod 1986). Elaborations ba-
sed on mixed strategies allow to model the degree
of uncertainty about the other’s motives, expected
behavior and discounting (Taylor 1987; Myerson
1991: 308). In particular the elaborations on the
expectations concerning the behavior of others ac-
tor in iterated games between two actors is equiva-
lent to a game which is played among members of a
heterogeneous group in which cooperators as well
as defectors exist. In each variant, updates about
the chances of encountering cooperators respective-
ly defectors will affect behavioral choices (Ebenhçh
& Pahl-Wostl 2008).
In many experiments, the psychology of social co-
operation found that people are more or less born
for cooperation and reciprocal exchange. They
start as cooperators, and they continue to be coope-
rators, but this is conditional on the behavior of
others. People intrinsically like to sanction defec-
tors, which is why cooperation in groups with non-
anonymity is much higher than in anonymous set-
tings.1 This experimental evidence basically provi-
des the underpinnings for the effects of group mem-
bership on cooperation presumed by the social
capital approach. The psychology of moral behavi-
or supplements this accounts by discussing the me-
chanisms of internalization, viz. the mechanisms of
shame, guilt and moral pride (Tangney et al. 2007).
Social psychologists argue for instance that the ef-
fects of socially shared norms occur in two forms,
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1 Cf. Fehr & Gintis (2007) for a summary on the psycho-
logical theories and the experimental evidence on social
cooperation.
basically also differentiating between internaliza-
tion and external reasons: normative social influen-
ce denotes the situation when people comply becau-
se they want to be liked by the group, while
informational social influence refers to a situation
in which a persons complies because she wants to
do the correct thing (Kallgren et al. 2000; Schultz
et al. 2008). The argument made here will provide
a rational underpinning to norm compliance.
Taking these explanations which differ substantial-
ly in how they presume norm compliance to opera-
te into account, the question remains when people
will actually start to deviate from norms. And,
moreover, which process – internalization, social
control, temptation, rational acceptance, or some-
thing else – is generally more important for norm
compliance?
The frame-selection model suggests the existence of
an important effect of information on norm com-
pliance. Assume that a frame is established, i.e. sha-
red among all members of the society, linking a cer-
tain prototypical situation to a behavioral script of
cooperative behavior and entailing specifically the
belief that the norm is valid. The frame-selection ar-
gument states that on recognizing the situation, the
cooperative frame will be activated and the behavi-
or will follow suit, typically without a rational cal-
culation of costs and benefits (Esser 2000). This
works, if a) the situation is identified as a concrete
instance of the abstract situational model for which
the frame model prescribes certain behavior and ac-
tivates certain expectations, viz. the norm (mat-
ching) and b) the frame as a situational model
exists and the norm is part of it. If the frame, i.e.
the model per se, is disrupted, or, more specifically,
if the belief that the other will be cooperative is eli-
minated from the model, people will start to devia-
te. In particular, they will start to calculate whether
deviation or compliance pays off.
If the norm is complied with and the belief in the
validity of the norm is widespread, it is rational to
comply with the norm. Suppose one enters an ex-
change and it is certain that the other side will
comply with whatever commitments are involved.
Compliance with the norm will then be reciproca-
ted and both sides will realize the benefits of coope-
ration: the benefits of the present cooperation and
the stream of benefits from future cooperation
which will be realized because the norm is perpe-
tuated. Given a respective belief, norm compliance
is rational.
As a counter example suppose that one enters an
exchange in a society in which no norms are valid
and in which it is certain that cooperation will be
exploited. Norm compliance is not an element of
the frame as the situational model. Instead, the in-
dividual now believes that defection will occur. In
such instances, ignoring norms is rational.
At its most basic the argument is that people will
cooperate in a situation if they believe that others
will cooperate, and they will defect if they believe
that others will defect. Information will affect res-
pective beliefs. In the first example, both sides play
a prisoner’s dilemma game firmly believing that the
other side will cooperate. In the second example,
both play the game firmly believing that the other
side will defect. The objective situation is the same
– it is the belief which makes all the difference for
individuals’ behavior and for both short-term and
long-term outcomes.
Beliefs about the likelihood of encountering coopera-
tion or defection in an interaction may be updated
with respect to whether the person one is dealing
with is cooperative or not (Deutsch 1958), or with
respect to whether the likelihood of encountering
someone who is abiding to norms is low or high.
If a belief in the validity of norms is firmly establish-
ed, i.e. if the frame as a model including the norm
is firmly established, actors will “automatically”
cooperate whenever they enter a cooperative situa-
tion. They may, at least to some degree, ignore con-
tradicting information about incidences of deviant
behavior and dismiss respective experience. Too
much contradicting information, however, will de-
stabilize the belief and change the frame. The belief
that a norm is valid and that it is rational to comply
with it will be replaced by the belief the norm is no
longer valid, and to continue cooperation would
potentially be harmful. Behavior will follow suit.
Believing that deviance is to be expected from
others, people will deviate.
This argument is similar in its explanatory scope
and predictions to an argument going back to Po-
pitz (1968: 17; cf. also Diekmann et al. 2011): If it
were common knowledge how often norms are
broken, people would disregard norms even more,
because breaking the rules is the new rule and pu-
nishment loses its stigmatizing effect. The breaking
of the norm then becomes what Cialdini (2003) la-
bels a descriptive norm: a norm about how most
people actually behave in a certain situation. The
frame approach differs from these explanations, in
that it explicitly allows for and models a deviation
which is motivated by temptation, while norm-
based explanations have difficulties to conceptually
integrate rational deviation from norms.
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Our main argument regarding an empirical applica-
tion of this explanation is that this belief depends
on the information the individual receives. In our
case, the information concerns the validity of the
norm in the society the person is living in: Is the
norm valid? Is it complied with by the majority of
people or only by a minority?
The belief about the validity of norms and the exis-
tence of the frame – understood as a model of the
situation and the behavioral script activated in the
situation – is based directly or indirectly on objecti-
ve information which may be publicly available
but may also result from personal experiences.
Media predominantly cover incidences where
norms were broken, and a message like “today, no
one deviated from a certain norm” will never make
the headlines (Norris 1996; Olken 2006; Furedi
2006). This is true for grave incidences of deviant
behavior, e.g. acts of violence, but also for more
subtle norms of social interaction frustrated by
cheating, corruption, fraud, or tax evasion. The
media, by reporting incidences of cheating, fraud,
and so on, provide information about the relevance
of a certain norm in a society. If the media report
incidences of massive tax evasion, this will limit the
validity attached to the norm of paying taxes. Lis-
tening to the news, an individual may well obtain
the impression that it is the only one actually pay-
ing taxes while everyone else is more clever, and
given such circumstances, deviation from the norm
would be rational.
Apart from the information component, other as-
pects may affect the likelihood of deviant behavior;
each is derived from one of the alternative explana-
tions given above. The first aspect arises from the
game theoretic perspective and concerns the nature
of the game underlying the interaction. Is the inter-
action a dilemma game or an assurance game? In
the case of dilemma games, the incentive to deviate
is unconditional. It is always, and irrespective of
what others do, tempting to defect. Free riding in
public traffic is the classical dilemma game. Irre-
spective of the behavior of the others, free riding is
always the option with the highest short-term
payoff. In the assurance game the case in which all
sides cooperate – comply with norms – is the best
outcome. But individual losses if others – for what-
ever reason – defect may be substantial. An ex-
change on a “black” market is a typical assurance
game: both sides would like to make a deal, but
both might hesitate to make the first step, i.e. to
hand over the money or the product. Thus, in inter-
actions of the dilemma type, there is one dominant
motive, which is to defect. In interactions of the as-
surance type, cooperation would be best, but only
if the other party choose to cooperate as well.
The second aspect concerns the social setting in
which the interaction takes place and the breach of
the norm occurs: Is it played in a bilateral face-to-
face setting, e.g. in the case of selling someone
something? Or is it played “anonymously”, against
an institution which is not actually a person. We
would expect that in the case of a face-to-face inter-
action the inhibition threshold for defecting and
cheating is higher than for defecting and cheating
in an anonymous setting, i.e. in the case of faking
documents, avoiding taxes, or claiming government
benefits one is not entitled to. Cheating an anony-
mous institution may also take the form of both
sides of an exchange colluding against the institu-
tion, e.g. in the case of paying cash to avoid paying
VAT. Both sides benefit at the cost of the “govern-
ment” and the perception that harm is done is weak
because the collective impact of this particular inci-
dence of fraud is negligible.
Other aspects which were found to be relevant for
norm compliance are internalization, social control
(e.g. peer-group effects) and what has been labeled
the rational acceptance of norms because of their
benefits or because the individual has had a say in
the making of norms.
3 Dependent Variables
The data set used here is the second wave of the Eu-
ropean Social Survey (Jowel et al. 2005). This sur-
vey was conducted among persons of at least 15
years of age in West and Central European coun-
tries in 2004/5, covering themes like morality, poli-
tical attitudes and socio-economic background in-
formation. The net sample size is about 30,000
respondents in 24 countries. The survey contains
seven questions on the personal compliance with
norms, asking about whether and how often the
respondent did engage in certain forms of “immo-
ral” behavior. Though it is perfectly clear that data
based on respective responses will presumably un-
derestimate the frequency of deviant behavior sub-
stantially, the data that were gained in this survey
allow insights in the mechanisms underlying devi-
ant behavior.
The variables on which the analysis is based refer
to respondents’ replies to the following battery of
questions: How often – if ever – respondents have
Q kept change from shop assistant/waiter when
given too much during the last 5 years.
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Q paid cash with no receipt to avoid VATor tax du-
ring the last 5 years.
Q sold something second-hand and concealed its
faults during the last 5 years.
Q misused/altered documents to pretend eligibility
during the last 5 years.
Q made an exaggerated false insurance claim du-
ring the last 5 years.
Q offered favor/bribe to public official for service
during the last 5 years.
Q falsely claimed government, social security or
other benefits during the last 5 years.
The answer categories were for each of these seven
items: never, once, twice, 3 or 4 times, 5 times or
more in the last five years, the coding is 0 to 4.
We constructed the following variables which cover
certain aspects we are particularly interested in, es-
pecially regarding the setting in which deviant be-
havior occurs:
– BrokenNorm is simply the additive index of how
often the respondent has broken any of the above-
mentioned norms. As argued above there are quali-
tative differences regarding the setting in which the
norm is broken.
– BrokenNormFace2Face is an additive index of
how often the respondent has cheated in a face to
face interaction – e.g. kept change, sold something
second hand which she knew to be faulty, but
covered the fault to sell it nevertheless or at a better
price. We would expect that the inhibition to do
this may be higher than for instance in a situation
in which one is corresponding with a bureaucracy.
– BrokenNormAnonymous is an additive index of
how often the respondent has broken a norm in a
“faceless” anonymous interaction with an institu-
tion, by which we mean fudging documents, ma-
king exaggerated insurance claims or trying to
claim benefits from the government or the social se-
curity system he is not entitled to. The last variant
takes into account that there are forms of deviant
behavior which, while clearly illegal, are often not
seen as being immoral. The immoral behavior is
not committed against the person one is dealing
with, who indeed may be just as willing to do this,
because both sides benefit. The third party, viz. the
community, at whose expense this is done, is not
present, respectively much too abstract to care
about.
– BrokenNormCollusive measures how often the
respondent has paid cash to avoid paying VAT.
4 Explanatory Variables
The explanation presented below links deviant be-
havior to the information which an individual has
received. Information which affects the belief about
the validity of norms can originate from the macro-
level, i.e. by way of public reports about deviant be-
havior, and from the micro-level, i.e. from personal
experience of the validity of norms. The empirical
question is how important this explanation is com-
pared to other explanations of norm compliance.
From the enumeration of psychological, political
and sociological explanations discussed in the above
section, a range of explanatory variables can be
generated which measure the factors that are rele-
vant according to each explanation. Depending on
the approach, explanatory variables are located
either on the macro-level of society or on the mic-
ro-level of individual experience.
4.1 Micro-level Variables
The information-based explanation can be opera-
tionalized using several indicators. An immediate
information the individual has is the personal expe-
rience of incidences in which the norm was broken,
i. e. in which an individual has suffered from being
the victim of deviant behavior. The more often this
was the case, the more evidence the respondent has
that the norm is no longer valid and that honest be-
havior will not be reciprocated.
We generated an indicator called ExperienceChea-
ting which measures how often in the last five years
the respondent experienced that norms were bro-
ken. The indicator combines the following survey
questions: Were you overcharged by a craftsman?
Were you sold food with bad bits concealed in it?
Did a bank or an insurance took advantage of you
by offering you not the best deal? Were you sold
things second hand which had concealed faults?
Did a public official ask for a bribe?.
In addition, there is information about a much
more crucial and personal experience of deviant be-
havior, namely the question whether the respondent
or a respondent’s relative was subject to a crime.
Getting cheated may not matter that much for the
belief that in the society norms are still relevant,
but being victim of an assault or a burglary may
change your view more fundamentally. We would
predict that having been subject to a crime increa-
ses the likelihood of deviant behavior, for the very
reason that it is a very relevant information to up-
date your beliefs about the status of norm compli-
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ance. It informs individuals, in a drastic way, that
even on a very basic level, the “social contract” is
no longer respected (CrimeVictim).
The internalization of norms is the central element
of sociological theories of norm compliance. If a
norm is currently internalized, it is assumed to be
effective in governing behavior. This internalization
has to become ever more fragile and has to dissolve
before the actual behavior will eventually change.
From the information based explanation, a similar
implication can be derived: the belief about the va-
lidity of the norm is updated, and behavior follows
suit. As we have only cross-sectional data, we can-
not investigate the processes by which internaliza-
tion is dissolved and whether indeed the dissolution
of belief comes first. On a psychological level, there
is also the possibility to infer from one’s behavior
on one’s beliefs. What we can test is the relevance
of the current level of internalization. Internaliza-
tion of norms may come in two variants. On the
one hand, it may be conceptualized in very abstract
terms, referring to notions like “law” and “proper
behavior”. On the other hand, it may refer to very
specific forms of deviant behavior. The difference
between the two is that persons may or may not see
a certain behavior as deviant. For some people, cer-
tain forms of deviant behavior will simply not
count as breaking a norm. They may agree that the
behavior is wrong if they are explicitly asked to
take a stance, but otherwise they will not give it a
thought. To capture this distinction, we generated
two indicators. The first is the (dis-)approving atti-
tude towards the very concrete forms of deviant be-
havior listed above (InternalizationSpecific). The
second is an indicator of rather abstract internaliza-
tion, an additive index measuring agreement with
two items, the “importance to follow always the
rules” and the “importance of always behaving
properly” (InternalizationGeneral).
The costs of norm compliance, but also the tempta-
tion to and costs of disregarding norms, differ
among people. They do so in relation to certain so-
cioeconomic features which serve as control varia-
bles:
– Income as the subjective costs of norm compli-
ance may affect whether and what norms are bro-
ken. It might be cheap for someone who is quite
rich to comply with the norm of not free riding in
the public transport system or not to claim govern-
ment benefits. The first is too small an amount to
bother and in the case of the second “temptation”,
a wealthy respondent is probably so far above the
level of entitlement that it is not a realistic option
anyway. But if someone is poor, the price of a ticket
may matter and if someone is close to being entitled
to claiming benefits, it may be a realistic option to
give it a try.
– Importance for reputation. Breaking a norm in-
curs certain risks, e.g. costs in material terms, as
fine or other material sanctions, but also in terms
of loss of reputation. There is a substantial literatu-
re stating that the interest in reputation fosters co-
operation and honesty, whereby the mechanism is
similar to the one proposed by Axelrod (1986): in
the long run, the payoff of reputation outweighs
the short run gain made by defecting.2 Further-
more, there are internal costs: If a person cares
about the view others have of her, she may abstain
from certain forms of behavior for fear of losing re-
putation and for fearing embarrassment if she is
caught in the act of behaving in an “unsocial” or
nasty manner. On the other hand, if a person
doesn’t care, this constraint is absent. Two varia-
bles, the importance the respondent assigns to be
admired and to be respected, are used to cover the
reputational stakes of the respondent. A further
indicator could potentially be constructed on the
argument that the higher the socioeconomic status,
the higher the loss in the case of breaking rules and
getting caught in doing so will be. There is however
no feasible indicator of this in the data set used.
–Minority. There is substantial evidence that ethnic
fragmentation lowers trust, in particular between
groups (Lenard 2008: 321; Letki 2008). The argu-
ment among political sociologists is that in the case
of discrimination, trust, reciprocity and coopera-
tion are all focused on the in-group, and not on the
majority which is discriminating the respondent. In
such cases, the norms are “theirs, not mine”. We
operationalize this mechanism by including whether
the respondent feels discriminated by the majority
in the country for whatever reason.
– MemberReligion and Religious. An important as-
pect of internalization is of course religion – not so
much the internalization of the religious norm, but
the internalization of the fear that a breach of the
norm will be sanctioned by some “higher” authority.
We use two indicators: the formal membership in a
religion and the degree to which the respondent clas-
sifies herself as religious, i.e. the degree to which the
mechanism of “internalized fear” matters.
– ValueEquality. Specific attitudes towards people
may matter for norms which concern bilateral ex-
164 Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Jg. 40, Heft 4, August 2011, S. 158–173
2 See Ely & Välimäki (2003) for an overview and for a
counterargument.
changes – e.g. keeping change from the shopkeeper
or concealing faults of something you sell to some-
one second hand. Interpersonal attitudes will not
matter in the case of “faceless” interactions, e.g. in
the case of taxpaying or when dealing with an insu-
rance company. The attitude towards people in ge-
neral can be positive or negative, and will be mea-
sured by the Rosenberg trust scale (Rosenberg
1956), consisting of three questions about whether
in general people can be trusted, whether in general
people are fair and whether in general people are
helpful. The argument is that an individual will ab-
stain from cheating people if it holds them in high
regards. However, on the other hand, the argument
can also be made in exactly the opposite direction:
cheating becomes more attractive and easier if the
others are generally trusting and may accept an ex-
cuse even in case the cheater is caught in the act.
The flip side of believing people to be trustworthy
is to believe that people are gullible. Another aspect
of the general attitude towards people and fairness
is the value an individual places on an equal distri-
bution of wealth in the society.
– FrameFit. The degree to which the belief – “the
norm is generally complied with” – still fits or is al-
ready put in question will also matter for the devia-
tions. If the respondent firmly believes in the predo-
minance of the norm, she will not worry about
being treated dishonestly. The question we use to
cover this is “How worried are you of being treated
dishonestly?”. If the belief is put into question, this
will first of all express itself in a certain cautious-
ness. This may not immediately affect behavior, but
it is an indicator of the beliefs’ lessening grip on a
respondent’s mind.
– PeerGroup. An important factor for the indivi-
dual’s behavior is the social environment which in-
dicates what norms are still valid (see the argument
of the social capital school sketched above). Social
involvement per se might not matter that much be-
cause you will not ask someone in the club in which
you are a member to assist you in cheating for the
fear that you will be rejected and that the word will
spread. But in your network of close friends, this
might be very different. First of all, the network is
not necessarily overlapping, i.e. if you ask one
friend, the risk of gaining a bad reputation is smal-
ler, because this person might not inform the others
in your network of friends. The European Social
Survey asks whether the respondent could ask per-
sons in his circle of friends to assist in cheating,
more specifically, in claiming government benefits
to which the respondent is not entitled. We inter-
pret this as how strongly the peer group tolerates or
even accepts and support cheating. There is unfor-
tunately no data on the respondent’s membership
in voluntary associations.
– TV_total as a measure of media exposure. As sta-
ted above, media, in particular TV, tend to report
bad news, and incidences of deviant behavior are
bad news. Thus we presume that people with stron-
ger media exposure, in particular to TV, will be less
likely to believe that the norms are still abided to.
4.2 Macro-level Variables
The political explanation of norm compliance
states that the perceived legitimacy of the norm is a
relevant factor for norm compliance. Prior re-
search, in particular by Tom Tyler (2006) has
shown compliance with norms to depend on the le-
gitimacy the individuals assign to norms. The legiti-
macy of norms crucially depends on the legitimacy
of the norm-maker but also to the individual’s role
in the process by which the norm was made.3 It de-
pends on aspects like procedural fairness and invol-
vement. Applied to the question at hand, we would
argue that in a democratic system the compliance
with norms is – ceteris paribus – higher because the
individuals are subject to norms they themselves
took part in creating through the democratic pro-
cess. Thus a control variable on the macro level is
the degree of democracy in the country, measured
as a combination of the Freedom House index of
political and civil liberties (Freedom House 2003).
The belief that certain norms are valid in the society
a person is living in is influenced by the publicly
available information about how matters stand
with respect to the compliance with norms across
society. Our explanation specifically refers to infor-
mation and firstly this concerns the incidence of im-
moral behavior in society. We use the Corruption
Perception Index, CPI, provided by Transparency
International, to measure the incidence of corrup-
tion as a type of immoral behavior in society. High
values indicate absence of corruption. The CPI
measures three effects:
Firstly, it covers the baseline validity of a certain
but far reaching norm: is there, as a baseline, a high
degree of compliance with norms or is breaking the
rules – by giving and accepting bribes etc. – simply
the way things are?
Peter Kotzian: Cosi fan tutte: Information, Beliefs, and Compliance with Norms 165
3 Tyler (2006) provides an extensive review of the psycho-
logical aspects of legitimacy and the implications for poli-
tics and compliance.
Secondly, in a society in which bribes are not usual,
individuals behave in a more “moral” manner for
the simple reason that corruption takes two. If a
person cannot find an official to accept his bribe in
order to achieve what he wants, that person will
not engage in the respective form of corruption –
not because he would consider it inappropriate, but
because he is not presented with opportunities to
bribe his way to what he wants.
Thirdly, and this is close to the argument of compli-
ance due to legitimacy, the factual acceptance of
norms depends on the perceived integrity of the
norm maker, i.e. the political system. If the political
system is corrupt, it will be held in low esteem just
as much as the norms which it produces (Anderson
& Tverdova 2003; Bowler & Krap 2004). We
would expect that this matters in particular for
norms like those about paying taxes (Scholz & Lu-
bell 1998). If the political system is corrupt –
examples would be Japan and Italy (Pharr 2000;
della Porta 2000) – the acceptance of and the com-
pliance with norms produced by the system will
presumably be lower even though it might be fully
democratic.
As for macro-level control variables, we will con-
trol for the level of wealth, measured as GDP per
capita. Another macro-level feature found to be re-
levant for social trust and pro-social behavior is the
level of equality (Rothstein & Uslaner 2005). If a
society is fragmented, the argument is that the laws
are made for the upper classes and implemented in
their favor. We control for this by using the Gini in-
dex of inequality in income distribution from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators; (World
Bank 2008). The exact description of each variable
is given in the appendix.
5 Implementation and Results
The explanation makes use of macro- and micro-
level factors and the statistical implementation is
chosen accordingly. An explicit task is to explore
the cross-national variation using properties of the
country on the one hand, and within country varia-
tion using features of the individuals on the other.
The appropriate method for this approach is multi-
level regression (Snijders & Bosker 1999; Steenber-
gen & Jones 2002) which allows estimating si-
multaneously the effect of macro- and micro-level
features.
The basic data set is the second round of the Euro-
pean Social Survey, conducted 2003 to 2004, which
was supplemented with macro-level data (cf. Ap-
pendix). The countries included are very different,
ranging from Switzerland to the Ukraine, which
also yields substantial variation in the macro-level
variables.
Table 1 gives the results of a multilevel regression
of each of the four norm compliance variables on
the independent variables.
5.1 Information Effects
All information effects have the predicted direction
and substantial magnitudes. Information in the
form of personal experience (ExperienceCheating)
is the strongest factor for breaking norms. If the in-
dividual was cheated, she will also cheat.
Doubt about the validity of the norm also increases
the incidence of norm breaking. If people start to
worry about whether the “social contract” is valid,
i.e. about whether the overall reciprocity still holds,
the belief will start to loose its grip and deviant be-
havior becomes much more likely. In the case of
doubt and updating beliefs based on new informa-
tion the breaking of norms takes place because peo-
ple rationally adapt to an environment which has
changed and not because they are instrinsically mo-
rally corrupt.
Having been victim of a crime is a strong indication
that there are people around you who do not res-
pect what has since Hobbes been considered the
most basic manifestation of reciprocity, namely per-
sonal safety. Just as expected, receiving this piece of
information also puts a respondent’s belief in ques-
tion.
TV consumption, i.e. being exposed to “bad news”,
also has a corrosive effect on compliance and, in
our interpretation, this effect operates by de-
stroying the belief that people by and large comply
with norms. This effect, however, is only of a minor
magnitude.
5.2 Micro-level Effects
The individual-level variables explain why a certain
person deviates in her norm compliance from the
country average. If norms are highly internalized,
in particular in specific terms, the incidence of devi-
ant behavior is lower. Vague notions of law and
propriety matter only little for actual norm compli-
ance.
There is no indication of a calculation of “reputa-
tional costs” which reduces the chances of breaking
norms. The degree to which others and their opi-
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Table 1 Factors for Breaking Norms
BrokenNorm NormFace2Face NormAnonymous NormCollusive
Macro Level Variables
gdp2002 –0.037 –0.023 –0.007 –0.034
0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010
CPI2003 0.065 0.133 0.009 0.007
0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
GINI2000 –0.033 –0.040 –0.032 0.011
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007
Democracy –0.046 –0.029 –0.009 –0.032
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Micro Level Variables
Age –0.102 –0.203 –0.040 0.006
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007
Female –0.096 –0.039 –0.023 –0.108
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006
Education 0.014 –0.009 –0.011 0.032
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007
Income 0.068 –0.006 –0.002 0.118
0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
Minority 0.006 0.000 0.016 0.006
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006
TV_total 0.015 0.043 –0.003 –0.010
0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006
PeopleFair 0.008 0.012 –0.008 0.009
0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
PeopleHelpful –0.016 –0.010 –0.003 –0.016
0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007
PeopleTrustworthy 0.000 –0.004 0.003 0.004
0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
MemberReligion 0.004 –0.028 –0.007 0.026
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007
Religious –0.025 –0.025 0.000 –0.025
0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007
ValueEquality –0.036 –0.032 –0.011 –0.026
0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006
Information Effects
ExperienceCheating 0.200 0.112 0.082 0.166
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
CrimeVictim 0.028 0.021 0.021 0.019
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006
FrameFit –0.010 –0.016 –0.014 0.010
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
NormInternaliationSpecific –0.158 –0.091 –0.085 –0.135
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
nion about a person matter for this person actually
increases the level of breaking norms. People are
seemingly not afraid of “getting caught” as they are
not afraid of loosing reputation by deviant behavi-
or. The substantial effect of the peer group adds
another twist to the mechanism: if most of the res-
pondent’s friends would assist in cheating the gov-
ernment or another institution, this strongly increa-
ses the likelihood of cheating. This implies that the
reputation in the peer group, i.e. among friends, is
not decreased by cheating – cheating may even inc-
rease it. This finding is in line with discussions of
the “dark sides” of social capital and of processes
in which members of groups focus cooperative be-
havior and trust on other group members at the ex-
pense of the society as a whole and other groups
(Levi 1996).
Most socioeconomic variables have the expected ef-
fects: higher levels of income makes overall brea-
king of norms more likely but given the pattern of
its impact on the different types of breaches of
norms, the effect comes about solely by the fact
that wealthy people more often avoid VAT by pay-
ing cash. The reasons underlying this finding are
presumably twofold: Firstly, wealthier people buy
more expensive things so that the absolute amount
of VAT is higher, creating a higher incentive to
avoid it. Secondly, wealthier people can more easily
pay for substantial purchases in cash. Cheating in
such cases is therefore not actually a question of
morality, but one of having an incentive and also
the means to pursue it.
Education has roughly the same effect as income.
Females are more law abiding than men, and elder
people are more law abiding than younger ones.
Feeling discriminated does not increase the likeli-
hood of deviant behavior in dealings with other
people, but increase it this likelihood in the setting
of the “anonymous” breaking of norms. We inter-
pret this as alienation from the “system” and its
institutions, rather than from the people one is dea-
ling with on a daily basis. While formal member-
ship in a religion does matter only for certain
norms, being religious exerts a strong positive effect
on norm compliance. The general attitude towards
people matters only slightly, if at all. The only va-
riable which has an, albeit very minor, effect is the
belief that people are helpful. Contrary to the other
two variables which refer to rather lofty terms like
trustworthiness and fairness, we would suspect that
this helpfulness variable reflects to some degree the
respondent’s experience of having received help
and having been treated well by others in the past,
and a felt obligation to reciprocate. The value assig-
ned to equality also increases the compliance with
norms.
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Table 1 (Continue)
BrokenNorm NormFace2Face NormAnonymous NormCollusive
NormInternaliationGeneral –0.107 –0.080 –0.046 –0.083
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
ImportanceAdmired 0.036 0.031 0.023 0.022
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
ImportanceRespect 0.034 0.014 0.020 0.035
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
PeerGroup 0.111 0.095 0.101 0.051
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
Model Fit
R2 within 0.181 0.131 0.048 0.107
R2 between 0.566 0.541 0.403 0.132
R2 overall 0.190 0.145 0.051 0.104
N 30329 31033 31178 30947
Countries 24 24 24 24
Note: Variables are standardized; entries are b and SE in italics as obtained using STATA xtreg routine with random effects. Due to standar-
dization, the magnitudes of the coefficients are directly comparable.
5.3 Macro-level Variables
The macro-level variables account for the average
level of the compliance measures in different count-
ries. The effects are robust against the exclusion of
macro-level variables. Included as a very basic con-
trol variable, GDP has a positive effect on norm
compliance. In wealthier societies, norms are on
average broken less often. We would argue that is
most likely to be the case simply because the neces-
sity to do so is less urgent. There is, however, also
the alternative interpretation that the effect is spu-
rious because some of the questions, like the one
about being sold food with bad bits mixed in, is
something which is more likely to happen in less
developed countries where street markets play a
more important role as opposed to supermarkets in
wealthier countries. Still, the “collusive” breaking
of norms, i.e. the paying cash to avoid VAT, is also
less frequent (at least reported or avowed less often)
in richer societies in which VAT rates and incentives
to dodge them are generally higher.
Two findings are counterintuitive, the first of which
is that norms are broken more often when less cor-
ruption is perceived. The CPI in which high values
indicate low levels of corruption has an increasing
effect on the incidence of breaking norms. The ef-
fect on the overall breaking of norms is only due to
the fact that norms are broken more often in face-
to-face interaction. For the breaking of norms in re-
lations to the state or in anonymous settings, the
CPI does not matter. Secondly, norms are broke
less often in a less egalitarian society. This seems
reasonable in the case of face-to-face interactions
which by all likelihood take place among equals
from the same societal strata. But the effect in the
case of anonymous norm breaking is counterintuiti-
ve to the argument that in fragmented societies
some strata do not feel a “belonging” to the system
and thus feel less bound by the system’s rules.
More in line with our expectations is the finding
that the procedural legitimacy of the norm giver,
proxied here as the degree to which the political
systems is democratic, which is to say that the citi-
zens subject themselves to norms which they them-
selves contributed to making through the political
process, decreases the incidence of breaking norms.
5.4 Explanatory Power
Multilevel regression differentiates the overall va-
riation into two components. The deviation is com-
posed of the deviation of the group mean – in this
case, the country’s mean – from the “grand mean”
(the average of the overall sample) plus the devia-
tion of an individual from the group mean (Snijders
& Bosker 1999: 16–22). Macro-level variables ex-
plain the deviation of the group mean from the
grand mean, i.e. the variation between countries
(between R2) in the average level of how often
norms are broken. Micro-level variables explain
the variation within the country, i.e. why a citizen
of a country is breaking certain norms more often
than another citizen of this country (within R2).
The explanatory power is given in the lower rows
of table 1. The overall R2 measures the degree to
which we can explain why a person differs from the
grand mean, combining the explanatory contribu-
tion of the country features and personal characte-
ristics. The overall explanatory power is on the
whole quite low, and varies from only 5 percent in
the case of the breaking of norms in the “anony-
mous” setting to about 20 percent in the case of the
overall incidence of breaking norms.
The macro-level variables can explain about half of
the between country variation in the compliance
with norms, only in the case of “collusive” brea-
king of norms the country features explain much
less variation. The explanatory power of the micro-
level variables varies from only 5 percent in the case
of the “anonymous” breaking of norms to 18 per-
cent in case of overall incidence of breaking norms.
Taken together, the low explanatory power indica-
tes that there are substantial factors which are not
included in the model, e.g. factors concerning the
situation in which deviations from the norm takes
place, including situational hints as proposed by
the “broken window” approach (Kelling & Wilson
1982). This may also indicate further issues with
respect to the degree to which concrete situations
match a situational model for which the frame
prescribes a certain, automatic, behavior.
6 Conclusion
This paper has explored the role of information
about the validity of norms for norm compliance.
At the theoretical level, we argued that people com-
ply with norms if they believe others will also com-
ply but update their belief about the validity of the
norm using information obtained from the media
and gained in personal experience. The empirical
findings indicate that the theoretical argument
underlying the paper is adequate: the experience-
based information that the “reciprocity” contract is
broken is the strongest factor for breaking norms.
The effect of information about the validity of
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norms is comparable in its strength to the internali-
zation of norms.
A first implication of this is that, as was found in
experimental studies, people are by nature recipro-
cal (Fehr & Gintis 2007: 45). People are – as a
baseline – not breaking the rules on their own ini-
tiative, but do so as a reaction to the experience of
breaches. They are willing to cooperate, but they
do not want to be the only one compliant to a norm
by which no one else is restrained. People, in other
words, take care not to be duped. If they believe the
societal contract still holds, they too will continue
to comply.
The meanwhile substantial literature in the discour-
se about social capital argues that social trust is the
main factor for solving social dilemmas (cf. Putnam
1993), which also offers an explanation for compli-
ance with norms. Contrary to these arguments, we
find that there are no effects of social trust on norm
compliance. What makes people comply with
norms is not blind trust which is by definition the
absence of knowledge and certainty, but belief ba-
sed on information that a norm is effective and that
it is hence rational to comply with it. As Levi
(1996) in response to Putnam’s argument has re-
marked, social embeddedness can work in either di-
rection. If an individual’s friends would go along in
breaking a norm, this strongly increases the chances
that the individual in question will break a norm,
and vice versa. Social embeddedness per se tells us
nothing, it depends on the group the individual is
embedded in.
The remaining unexplained variation, which is sub-
stantial, might be due to forms of internalization
for which we have no proxy, and to temptations
within the situation in which deviant behavior
takes place. Another psychological underpinning
might be what Cialdini (2003) denotes as injunctive
and descriptive norms: the former prescribe what
the appropriate behavior is, the latter describe what
kind of behavior typically occurs. This model also
implies an effect for information very similar to the
“broken window” theory proposed by Kelling &
Wilson (1982). It is indeed difficult to think of an
experimentum crucis to tip the scales in favor of
one of these theories.
The argument made here implies a certain long
term effect. Cooperation is a stable equilibrium,
even in the long-term. Just like the underlying mo-
del of reciprocity, it can very well explain an overall
deterioration of norm compliance – i. e. a ratchet
effect by which some immoral behavior or “moral
shocks” lead to even more immoral behavior (Gui-
so et al. 2007). Indeed one may at first be tempted
to think that it can explain only such cases. But it
can in principle also explain why the norm was in-
stalled and became effective in the first place, na-
mely by an updating of information about the in-
creasing rather than the decreasing validity of
norms. How social order came about in the first
place may not be an altogether different story from
how it dissolves.
If there is a practical implication, it is that breaking
norms has an effect which goes beyond the interac-
tion in which it occurred. Both defector and victim
will update their beliefs about breaking norms: the
former that breaking norms is feasible, the latter
that the breaking of norms is to be expected.
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Appendix: Description of Variables
Countries in the analysis: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germa-
ny, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and United Kingdom; for detailed documentation
see Jowel et al. 2005.
Dependendent Variables Mean Std. Dev.
BrokenNorm: index of how often respondent (R) has broken a norm; see text. 1.02 1.79
BrokenNormFace2Face: index of how often R has broken a norm in a face to face interaction;
see text.
0.36 0.87
BrokenNormAnonymous: index of how often R has broken a norm in an anonymous
interaction; see text.
0.09 0.51
BrokenNormCooperative: indicates whether R has ever paid cash in order to avoid paying VAT 0.54 1.10
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Macro Level Variables Mean Std. Dev.
gdp2002 GDP per Capita in US$, 2002 23184 11119
CPI2003: Corruption Perception Index, 10 = lowest level of corruption 6.70 2.24
GINI2000: Gini Index of familiy income distribution, high values indicate high inequaliy 31.10 4.79
Democracy: average score of political and civil liberties, high values indicate high levels of
democracy
–2.71 1.51
Micro Level Variables
Age: age of respondent in years 45.17 18.46
Female (1 = female) 0.54 0.50
Education: years of education 11.52 4.03
Income: household income of respondent, 10 = highest income class 5.73 2.78
CrimeVictim: respondent or close person was victim of crime (1 = yes) 0.20 0.40
Minority: respondent feels as member of a discriminated minority (1 = yes) 0.06 0.24
TV_Total: total time spent watching TV on an average weekday (0 = none; 7 more than
3 hours)
4.31 2.04
ExperiencedCheating: index of frequency the respondent experienced incidences of cheating;
R was cheated by craftsmen/shopkeeper, was cheated by buying food. was cheated by a
bank/insurance. was cheated buying second hand, was cheated by a public official
2.28 2.73
PeopleFair: 0 = most people take advantage of me, 10 = most people try to be fair 5.50 2.39
PeopleHelpful: 0 = people mostly look out for themselves; 10 = people mostly try to be helpful 4.73 2.41
PeopleTrustworthy: 0 = you can’t be to carefull in dealing with people, 10 = most people can
be trusted
4.92 2.49
MemberReligion: member of a religion (1 = yes) 0.62 0.49
Religious: respondents is religous (0 = not at all, 10 = very religious) 4.86 2.98
ValueEquality: government should reduce income differences (1 = strongly disagree,
5 = strongly agree)
3.84 1.05
NormInternalizationSpecific: additive index of current internalization of specific norms;
rating of certain forms of deviant behavior as wrong (1 = not wrong, 4 = seriously wrong);
list of deviant behaviors are the types of behavior used in the dependent variable
15.41 3.05
NormInternaliationGeneral: summary index combining respondent’s rating of the following
items: importance to do what is told and to follow rules; importance to behave properly;
“you should always obey the law even if it means missing good opportunities” (-6 to +9 scale,
9 = strong internalization)
1.31 2.34
FrameFit: “How worried are you about being treated dishonestly?“ (–2 = not at all worried,
+2 = very worried)
0.79 1.20
ImportanceAdmired: degree to which R wants to be admired (1 = not important,
6 = very important)
3.71 1.37
ImportanceRespect: degree to which R wants to be respected (1 = not important;
6 = very important)
3.80 1.36
PeerGroup : “Would friends support you to get unjustified government benefits?”
(0 = none would, 4 = all would)
1.45 0.71
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